On 9th October, 1899, the Boers issued their famous Ultimatum, to which they immediately received an answer that was brief and unmistakeable; but, unfortunately, the pen of the Government at first proved mightier than the sword, and by 3rd November White was shut up in Ladysmith. Then followed the failures of Methuen and Gatacre, and on 15th December General Buller was repulsed at Colenso. Thoroughly roused, the Government sent out Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener. On the night of 6th January, 1900, the Boers made a desperate attempt to take Ladysmith, while Buller again failed to relieve the town on the 22nd, and did not enter it until after Cronje was brought to bay at Paardeberg at the end of February. This period of disaster cast a gloom over the whole nation, which grew sullen and determined, and, when at last the tide began to turn, the sudden lifting of the burden immediately metamorphosed a silent depressed crowd into a cheering multitude, which on Mafeking day turned London into a veritable pandemonium; but the depression caused by unpleasant surprises was intense, and, therefore, the joy at finding the incubus gone was the more irrepressible. Hence the disorderly scenes upon the day in question. A reaction after the period of suspense was inevitable, and the greater the gloom the more violent would be the excitement that followed when the first ray of sunshine pierced the mist. Yet how little was this understood at the time. That financial barometer--the Bank rate--began to reflect the political situation early in October. Our state of unpreparedness was a by-word on the Continent, and when in September, 1899, the Boers displayed an unyielding attitude, which was at first mistaken for bravado, our overweening confidence in the British soldier blinded our eyes to the imperfections of our fighting machine. The Continent, which was better informed than the British Government, believed that the Boers were determined. On the 3rd October, when the Free State burghers occupied Van Reenen's Pass, the Bank advanced its rate to four-and-a-half per cent.; on the 5th October the rate was five per cent., and on the 30th November six per cent., where it remained until the 11th January, 1900, when five per cent. was recorded. But if the Government was unprepared the Bank of England was not, and from start to finish, by a judicious use of its rate of discount, an adequate supply of bullion was maintained in the Issue Department. Long experience had taught its lesson, and our financial machine, which was in a good state of preparedness, worked without a hitch. Who can doubt that if our fighting machine had been as ably handled, it would have done its work well from first to last?