garrison give the French, that a squadron of five ships was despatched to capture it, but all attempts failed, until want of ammunition and provisions led to its exhaustion. Even when compelled to capitulate, however, the small detachment made such terms that the British flag was not to be hauled down until the garrison had reached the ships, the men were to be permitted to wear their side arms, and were to be sent under a flag of truce to Barbadoes. A more extraordinary instance of coolness and bravery is not to be found in any page of our national history; and the Marine service has always been popular, for what was stated in 1775 is equally true now, that “the Marines recruited better in every part of the island [of Great Britain] than the line.” But, putting aside the operations undertaken solely by the marine, the soldier acting temporarily as such, or the bluejacket, there were many others in which the army shared, though they do not form part of a connected series of battles such as characterise more serious campaigns. They partake rather of the nature of naval raids for the specific annoyance of the enemy, or attempts at the actual capture of his outlying possessions. They are individually interesting in many ways, but it would be impossible to do more than tabulate them more or less in order of occurrence, emphasising only the share the army took in them. Practically ships of war either conveyed the soldiers as transports for the required duty, or themselves formed the escort and guard of the convoy of transports which accompanied the battleships, and for the time being formed part of the armada. Thus, when the Seven Years’ War broke out, the attention of the French was directed towards Minorca, which, captured in 1708 by Stanhope, was regarded as only second in importance to Gibraltar for a naval power having interests in the Mediterranean. Its capture was the first appearance of England as a naval power possessing a naval base in that closed sea. It was garrisoned by the 4th, 23rd, 24th, and 34th Regiments; and, unrelieved by Admiral Byng’s fleet, on whose co-operation alone was it possible for the defender to hold out, its commandant, Blakeney, was compelled to surrender in 1755, though the troops behaved with such gallantry after the terrible bombardment, with numerical odds against them of some 20,000 to 3000, that they were allowed to march out with drums beating and colours flying, with all the honours of war. The siege had lasted from May to July. It is a noteworthy instance of the absolute importance of a most full and cordial co-operation between the naval and military commanders in cases such as these, when the army, cut from its home base, is dependent on the navy for its line of communications. In the future, without full command of the sea, isolated posts and coaling stations will be always at the mercy of bold and skilful raids, unless powerfully armed and sufficiently garrisoned.