Restoring Shah Allum to the throne of the Moguls, Lake speedily followed up his victory by seizing Agra, and then still more decisively defeated Scindia’s army at Laswarree. In the preliminary skirmish the cavalry brigade, composed of the Royal Irish Hussars, the 27th and 29th Dragoons, and the native regiments, showed the greatest gallantry in checking the enemy’s retreat. During a long night march of nearly twenty-five miles, and in the battle itself, the 76th distinguished itself by its coolness and gallantry as throughout the campaign. The fighting in this battle showed more desperate tenacity than in any other previous battle in India. The loss to the British was about one-fifth of a force of some 4000 men, and the enemy stubbornly contested the ground, foot by foot and gun by gun. The operations of the other column had been equally successful, and though Holkar still fought on, the war ceased in 1805, and Cuttack was annexed. During these operations the 8th, 27th, and 29th Light Dragoons, and the 22nd, 65th, 75th, 76th, and 86th regiments had been employed in India. Thus practically terminated Wellesley’s active Indian career; as did that of Lake, not long after, by death. To both men is largely due the extension of our own Empire by the destruction of those of the Indian princelets. Lake’s bravery, his boldness even to rashness, is everywhere remarkable. On more than one occasion in this very war he had personally led the attacks, as Wellesley had, in his battles, directed them. He “was a man whose influence with his soldiers was unbounded, whose calmness in danger, whose self-reliance, and whose power of commanding confidence have never been surpassed. He had but one way of dealing with the native armies of India, that of moving straight forward, of attacking them wherever he found them. He never was so great as on the battlefield. He could think more clearly under the roar of bullets than in the calmness and quiet of his tent. In this respect he resembled Clive. It was this quality which enabled him to dare the almost impossible. That which in others would have been rash, in Lake was prudent daring.”[56] Of course in all such cases much depends on the arms and tactical system of the adversary. With most, if not all, of the native levies it seems to have been an axiom to avoid a decisive engagement save in overwhelming numbers; and rather to seek, by retiring before and ravaging the country, to deprive the enemy of supplies, while at the same time his flank and rear were harassed by cavalry masses.