Such seems to have been the tactical method of the armies both Lake and Wellesley had to meet. Of Lake’s own views in the matter there is nothing especially recorded; but of the last-mentioned general it is stated that he gave the following advice to his coadjutor in the Mahratta war:--“Suppose that you determine to have a brush with the enemy, do not attack their positions, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access, for which the banks of rivers afford them facilities. Do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well you may have entrenched it; but when you shall hear that they are on the march to attack you, secure your baggage and move out of your camp. You will find them in the common disorder of march; they will not have time to form, which, being but half-disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they have not chosen for the battle; a part of their troops only will be engaged, and you will gain an easy victory.” This was sound advice, and obtained for many years after the writer had returned to Europe, where this “General of Sepoys,” as Napoleon dubbed him, was to see harder work and a different style of fighting than Assaye. War broke out with the Ghoorkas in Nepal in 1813-15; other hostilities occurred with the Pindari freebooters in 1815, when the enemy, arrogant and blustering, were defeated by the 24th, 66th, and 87th, with Indian troops in addition under Ochterlony, and converted into friends. They had no great opinion of us at first. We had “been driven from Bhurtpore, which was the work of man: how should they then storm the mountain citadel, which was built by the hands of God?” But they took their punishment with good humour, and having appealed to China, as the suzerain power, to help them, after all requested _our_ assistance if the relieving army entered their territories. Thus this little frontier state of India first brought us within measureable distance of war with the Celestial Empire. Finally, there was fighting with the Mahrattas again, at Nagpore (where the second battalion of the Royal Scots behaved with exemplary steadiness), at Maheidpore and Corregaum, at Soonee and Talnere, and lastly, at the capture of the fortress of Assirghur, “the Gibraltar of the East.” In this latter “affair,” the Royal Scots, the flank companies of the 38th, 67th, and Madras European Regiments, vied with each other in the siege and storm of this most formidable fortress. The result of all these operations was that the bulk of our late enemy’s possessions was annexed to the Empire. The strength of the European army, both Imperial and local, had steadily grown. In 1817 there were four cavalry regiments, the 8th, 17th, 22nd, and 24th Light Dragoons, and the 7th, 8th, 14th, 65th, 67th, 87th, and 47th Regiments of the line, serving in India.