We have thus two factors to bear in mind with regard to the French defensive position at Charleroi--the resisting power of the Namur forts, and the unknown, to the French, proximity of Von Hausen's army. However substantial was the measure of reliance that the French General Staff and General Michel placed on the Namur forts, evidently General von Buelow regarded them as little more than passing targets for his siege guns. He seemed to have made a comparatively simple mathematical calculation of almost the number of shells necessary to fire, and the hours to be consumed in reducing the Namur forts to masses of debris. We can picture General von Buelow as he sat in the motor car with Marshal von der Goltz--the old gentleman with an overcoat buttoned up to his nose in August, and huge spectacles. Doubtless discussion ran mainly upon the impending attack of their Second Army on the French right. Emphasis would have been laid on the positions of the armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and crown prince advancing away to their left upon the forces of the French Generals Ruffey and de Cary. But there was apparently a German gap here between Von Buelow's army and the armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and crown prince, though we noticed previously Von Buelow's army came in touch with Saxon troops half way between Huy and Namur, when a detachment of Von Buelow's left wing was thrown across the Meuse at Ardenne. This gap was faced by the French extreme right resting on the southward Namur bend of the Meuse. It was possibly the "trap" military critics of the moment foresaw for the Germans. Quite likely the two German generals Von Buelow and Von der Goltz, chatting in their motor car, referred to this gap, and it is hardly a stretch of imagination to suggest a twinkle in the huge glasses of the old gentleman in the August overcoat, when now and then the name of Von Hausen was mentioned.