But when we turn to the more obscure parts of the nervous phenomena, those which we commonly call mental, we find ourselves obliged to stop abruptly. We may trace the external force to the sensory organ, we may trace this force into a nervous stimulus, and may follow this stimulus to the brain as a wave motion, and therefore as a form of physical energy. But there we must stop. We have no idea of how the nervous impulse is converted into a sensation. The mental side of the sensation appears to stand in a category by itself, and we can not look upon it as a form of energy. It is true that many brave attempts have been made to associate the two. Sensations can be measured as to intensity, and the intensity of a sensation is to a certain extent dependent upon the intensity of the stimulus exciting it. The mental sensation is undoubtedly excited by the physical wave of nervous impulse. In the growth of the individual the development of its mental powers are found to be parallel to the development of its nerves and brain--a fact which, of course, proves that mental power is dependent upon brain structure. Further, it is found that certain visible changes occur in certain parts of the brain--the brain cells--when they are excited into mental activity. Such series of facts point to an association between the mental side of sensations and physical structure of the machine. But they do not prove any correlation between them. The unlikeness of mental and physical phenomena is so absolute that we must hesitate about drawing any connection between them. It is impossible to conceive the mental side of a sensation as a form of wave motion. If, further, we take into consideration the other phenomena associated with the nervous system, the more distinctly mental processes, we have absolutely no data for any comparison. We can not imagine thought measured by units, and until we can conceive of such measurement we can get no meaning from any attempt to find a correlation between mental and physical phenomena. It is true that certain psychologists have tried to build up a conception of the physical nature of mind; but their attempts have chiefly resulted in building up a conception of the physical nature of the brain, and then ignoring the radical chasm that exists between mind and matter. The possibility of describing a complex brain as growing parallel to the growth of a complex mind has been regarded as equivalent to proving their identity. All attempts in this direction thus far have simply ignored the fact that the stimulation of a nerve, a purely physical process, is not the same thing as a mental action. What the future may disclose it is hazardous to say, but at present the mental side of the living machine has not been included within the conception of the mechanical nature of the organism.