There were two other factors which were overlooked. The first was the question of supplies. With Turkey in the war, it was impossible to send supplies to the Russian or any other armies operating in what was the old Russian Empire except by way of Murmansk and Archangel on the north or Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean. For example, it was impossible for the Ukrainian army, which was confronted with the German forces in the south, to receive any supplies except across Bolshevik-held territory. They could secure only those supplies that were left on their own soil at the time of the beginning of the Revolution. The failure of the Russian offensive of Kerensky had reduced these, and the troops opposing the Bolshevik bands were relatively unarmed. The second factor was the meaning of this war-weariness. It was opposed to fighting against the Central Powers. It was opposed to the preservation and maintenance of discipline. Yet with each advance in demoralization, the willingness to fight in scattered bands against a new enemy increased. The fanatic Bolsheviks, who refused to continue the war for any reason against the Central Powers, were only too ready in small bands to attack Ukraine. Part of this lay in the belief that there was still food in Ukraine and that this food was necessary for Moscow and Petrograd. Part of it lay in their equally fanatical belief that they were the real spokesmen of the laborers and peasants. At the same moment when they were opening negotiations to end the war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, they were commencing a war in Ukraine and in many other sections.