To all intents and purposes this act differed but little from the first vetoed bill. It continued the original Freedmen's Bureau Act in force for two years, and contained certain additional provisions for the education of the freedmen, for the recognition of their civil rights, and for the protection of such rights by military power. President Johnson, in his veto message, declared that a careful examination had convinced him that the same reasons assigned in his veto of February 19, applied also to this measure. Such legislation was justifiable only under the war power, and should not extend to times of peace. The now existing federal and state courts, he went on to say, were amply sufficient for the protection of the freedmen, and the existence of the prevalent disorders furnished no necessity for the extension of the bureau system. The practical operation of the bureau showed that it was becoming an instrument of fraud, corruption and oppression, while the civil rights bill, needless as it was, provided methods of protection far preferable to the military protection authorized by this bill. The legislation regarding the disposal of land was discriminating, unsafe, and unconstitutional, and in conclusion he urged upon Congress the dangers of class legislation. 5. The mere veto of the first Freedmen's Bureau bill would not have been of great significance had it been the only act of the President at this time offensive to the rank and file of the Republican party. But on two other occasions he acted very indiscreetly, February 7 and February 22, the latter coming so shortly after the veto message on the first bill that the antagonism of Congress was greatly intensified. On February 7, 1866, a delegation of colored representatives from fifteen States and the District of Columbia called upon President Johnson in order to present their wishes concerning the granting of suffrage to their race. Geo. T. Downing and Frederick Douglass acted as spokesmen. In reply, President Johnson described his sacrifices for the colored man, and went on to express his indignation at being arraigned by incompetent persons. Although he was willing to be the colored man's Moses, he was not willing "to adopt a policy which he believed would only result in the sacrifice of his [the colored man's] life and the shedding of his blood." The war was not waged for the suppression of slavery; "the abolition of slavery has come as an incident to the suppression of a great rebellion--as an incident, and as an incident we should give it the proper direction." He went on to state that the negro was unprepared for the ballot, and that there was a danger of a race war. The States must decide for themselves on the question of the franchise. "Each community is better prepared to determine the depository of its political power than anybody else, and it is for the legislature * * * to say who shall vote, and not for the Congress of the United States."[97]