But the author further observes: “Mr. Mill qualifies his admission respecting the effect of the alleged counteracting cause, by the all important words ‘_if present_;’ for in order to be valid, the reality of the alleged counteracting cause must be established, which is impossible; therefore the objection falls to the ground. No one knows better than Mr. Mill, that the assertion of a personal deity working miracles, upon which a miracle is allowed for a moment to come into court, cannot be proved; and therefore, that it cannot stand in opposition to a complete induction which Hume takes as his standard.” This passage strikes us as an extraordinary one to have been written by any one who possesses the logical powers of the author. We are dealing with a formal argument with a view of testing its validity, we have the fullest right to test it by a supposed case. That supposed case is the presence of an unknown cause, or an unknown combination of known causes, or the presence of a personal deity. If the argument breaks down under the application of these tests, it is worthless. Does the author mean to say, that it is necessary to prove every assumption to be a fact, before it can be used in argument? How about the assumptions in Euclid? I submit that the reasoning is by no means vitiated by the assumption, and consequently that by the application of the same principles of reasoning, Hume’s argument falls to pieces. In one sense the words “if present” are all important, yet it is not necessary to prove the fact in order to establish the validity of the reasoning, which is entirely independent of the truth of the assumption. Has the author never heard of contingent reasoning in which both antecedent and consequent may be false, but the proposition valid? “No one knows,” again says the author, “better than Mr. Mill, that the allegation of a personal God working miracles, upon which a miracle is for a moment allowed to come into court, cannot be proved.” It seems then after all that we are reasoning with a person who rejects theism; although he has been dealing with the question on principles which assume its truth. In arguing a question of this kind it is necessary to be consistent, and take our stand either on the principles of theism, or on those of pantheism or atheism, and not to fall back on either as the exigencies of the case demand. Least of all should this be done by a writer who charges the defenders of Christianity with shifting their ground to suit the necessities of their argument.