But is the case correctly stated? No doubt that the conception of a personal God is essential to it. But that of a personal God actually working miracles forms no portion of it. If this were assumed, the entire reasoning would be a _petitio principii_. We are considering whether miracles are possible; or if, supposing one to be wrought, it can be established by evidence. All that we assume is, that God _can_ work miracles, not that He has wrought them. Whether we can prove by good evidence that He has wrought miracles, is quite independent of the present question. “No one knows better than Mr. Mill, that the assertion of a personal deity working miracles cannot be proved.” It is perfectly true that Mr. Mill believed that the evidence adduced to prove the being of a personal God was insufficient, and that respecting the origin of all things, nothing can be known. But yet it is impossible to treat the existence of a personal God as a bare assumption. “It is impossible to be proved,” says the author. But to whom? To minds constituted like Mr. Mill’s. The evidence that a personal God exists has appeared irresistible to an overwhelming majority of mankind, including a great majority of minds gifted with equal, and even with greater powers than that of Mr. Mill. One might imagine from the mode in which this point is here represented, that the belief in the existence of a personal God was exploded among all men of intellect, and that the proofs adduced for it were unworthy of attention. Surely the question of miracles has a legitimate place in the court which tries the issue of their truth or falsehood. One more point requires notice. Hume says, “Though the being, to whom the miracle is attributed be in this case Almighty, it does not on that account become a whit more probable, since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions in the usual course of nature.”