It is therefore no necessary consequence, because we ascribe to God some attributes which are infinite, and others which are perfect, that God must therefore be unknowable or unthinkable. We may know much about Him, without knowing all things. Our not knowing all about things does not render them either unknowable or unthinkable. Our knowledge may be imperfect; but as far as it goes it maybe real. If we were to affirm that we only know that which we know perfectly, or were unable to reason on imperfect knowledge, mental progress would be brought to a standstill. Nor is it right to affirm that we are only reasoning in a circle when we reason from His moral attributes as displayed in the government of the world in favour of the probability of a revelation; or if because a revelation which claims to be from God, bears the impress of His character, we employ this fact as an evidence that it comes from Him. To affirm that He is unknowable or unthinkable is to proclaim that man has no concern with God, and that all revelation is impossible; therefore, the objections urged against the evidence of supernatural religion on these grounds are untenable. But there are the difficulties about the Absolute and the First Cause. It has been urged that the Absolute is that which is out of relation to every thing else—perfectly independent in itself. It is argued, therefore, if God be this Absolute, he cannot be the first Cause, because a cause can only be a cause by its being in relation to that of which it is the cause. For similar reasons, if he be the first Cause, He cannot be the Absolute. But as He is both, He must therefore be unknowable and unthinkable. It is impossible in a treatise like this to enter into such profound metaphysical questions. For my present purpose, I can safely refer to Mr. Mill’s discussion on this subject. As far as the views in question bear adversely on Christian evidence, he has sufficiently refuted them. It is not fair for unbelievers to put forth these positions as subversive of Christianity, without answering the reasonings of so eminent an unbeliever as Mr. Mill in proof of their inconclusiveness, or even alluding to the fact that he has pronounced them untenable. There is no point which reasoners of this class have laboured more diligently to prove than that it is impossible for human reason to think of God as a person. The assumption of the personality of God is the foundation of the Christian argument, without which, even if the occurrence of miracles could be proved as objective facts, they would have no evidential value. It follows, therefore, that if our only mode of attaining the knowledge of the personality of God be from revelation, we are arguing in a vicious circle.