Briefly stated, the argument of unbelief is as follows: God is the infinite Being. Personality is a conception which necessarily involves the finite. Therefore it cannot be predicated of an infinite Being. It follows therefore that to speak of God as infinite, and at the same time as a person, involves a contradiction. It is an unquestionable fact that the only beings whom we are directly acquainted with as persons are finite beings, _i.e._ men. No less certain is it that the only beings whom we know to be possessed of wisdom and intelligence are finite beings, _i.e._ men, and those various classes of animals by which the latter quality is manifested. The argument is equally valid for proving that wisdom and intelligence can only belong to finite beings; and consequently that the existence of wisdom and intelligence in the first Cause of all things is inconceivable, and the assumption that He is wise and intelligent is a contradiction. The same argument is no less valid against ascribing any moral perfection to Him, or in fact any other, for all our knowledge of such things is both in itself finite, and derived from finite beings. But it even goes further than this. If, as the positive philosophy lays down, our real knowledge of things is confined to direct subjects of cognition; as the only beings which we know to be possessed of wisdom and intelligence are men and animals, it is quite contrary to sound reasoning to infer that these qualities can be possessed by any other class of finite beings. To do so is to transfer human conceptions to beings who are not human. Equally valid would be the reasoning of an animal, if he could reason on the subject, as for instance a horse or a dog, that the existence of wisdom and intelligence beyond his own limited sphere was an unwarrantable assumption. Pantheists have also propounded theories on the assumption of the existence in nature of an unconscious wisdom and intelligence. This assumption is open to the most formidable objections; but even on their own principles it is utterly invalid; for if on the grounds which they allege it is impossible to ascribe personality to God, the same reasonings are equally valid against ascribing wisdom and intelligence to unconscious nature. I conclude, therefore, that it by no means follows because our direct knowledge of personality is confined to human beings, and is derived from them, that personality itself cannot be conceived of as a property belonging to any other than human beings. It is absurd to maintain that the qualities of things must be confined to those things from which we learn their existence.