The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical: Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine RevelationRow, C. A. (Charles Adolphus)
Religion
The Supernatural in the New Testament, Possible, Credible, and Historical: Or, An Examination of the Validity of Some Recent Objections Against Christianity as a Divine Revelation
Row, C. A. (Charles Adolphus)
Bible. New Testament -- Evidences, authority, etc.; Miracles; Revelation; Supernatural in the Bible
But it will be objected that the very essential notion of personality is
limitation; consequently that although it may be conceived of as belonging
to limited beings, it transcends the power of thought to conceive of it as
the attribute of a being who is unlimited or infinite; that is to say,
that although it lies within the power of thought to conceive of the Being
who had adequate power to build the universe as a Person, because the
power may be a limited power, yet when I ascribe to Him beyond this the
possession of all possible power, the conception of personality becomes
unthinkable. This is the real meaning of the affirmation, unless our
reasonings are to be confined within the region of abstractions. But we
have no assurance that such reasonings are valid, unless we can bring them
to the test of some concrete form of thought.
Next: It by no means follows because our conception of personality is
derived from finite beings, that it is necessarily limited to them; and
that it cannot be thought of in connection with a being, some of whose
attributes are infinite and others perfect; in other words, that the idea
of finiteness is necessarily involved in that of personality. What are the
conceptions that make up the idea of our own personality? I reply, the
power to affirm “I” of one’s own being—the possession of will—the power of
self‐consciousness, and these in union with rationality. These conceptions
we undoubtedly derive from the contemplation of our own finite being, but
there is nothing in them which is necessarily limited to the finite. If
the conception of an infinite being is possible (and the fact that it is
so constantly introduced into this controversy proves that it is
possible), then there is no reason why these conceptions, which certainly
contain in them nothing quantitative, should not be applicable to such a
being. The real fact is, these conceptions are not inherently finite,
because they have nothing in them of a quantitative character,—they are
only derived from a being whose manifestation in space we conceive of
under the form of limitation, and whose attributes are neither infinite
nor perfect.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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