1. The recognition of the American National Red Cross, with its permanent organization, its governmental status, and its direct accountability to Congress for all expenditures, as the proper national agency through which relief funds for great disasters should be collected and administered; thus securing unity of effort, certainty of policy, and a center about which all local relief agencies may rally. 2. The importance of postponing the appointment of sub-committees until a strong central committee has been able to determine general policies and methods of procedure. The hasty organization of sub-committees at San Francisco resulted in much unnecessary overlapping effort and some friction when committees got in each other's way. The relief forces were not united until a whole week after the disaster, and after unfortunate difficulty and bitterness. 3. The desirability of contributions, especially those in kind, being sent without restrictions, as only the local organization is able to measure relative needs at different periods of the work. At San Francisco much pitifully needless restrictions imposed by those who sent funds or supplies from distant states. The delays in securing authority for the wise use of these contributions were well-nigh intolerable. The only safe course lies in placing implicit trust in an efficient and recognized director of relief such as the Red Cross is in a position to furnish. 4. The value of utilizing for emergency administration a body so highly organized and so efficient as the United States Army, to take charge of camps, and to bring to points of distribution the supplies required for those in need of food and clothing. 5. The wisdom of reducing the bread line and the camp population as quickly as possible after the disaster so that the relief resources may be conserved to meet the primary need of rehabilitation. The care used in emergency expenditures means much in husbanding resources so that permanent rehabilitation may be efficient and thorough. 6. The need of establishing a central bureau of information to serve from the beginning of the relief work as a clearing house, to prevent confusion and waste through duplication of effort. 7. The necessity of utilizing the centers of emergency distribution for the later rehabilitation work of district communities and corps of visitors. 8. The necessity of incorporation for any relief organization that has to deal with so large a disaster.