The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis: A History with Documents — John Shaqi
The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis: A History with DocumentsNordlund, Karl
History
The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis: A History with Documents
Nordlund, Karl
Norway -- Politics and government -- 1814-1905; Sweden - -Politics and government -- 1814-1905
On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet
been published. Buth it may nevertheless, with great certainty, be
assumed _that the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really,
among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of
foreign administration "into her own hands_." The great fear of such a
contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of
this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well
informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more
confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made
by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communique by
the Swedish government differed from its own[27:1]. This supposition is
vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the
Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the
Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a
Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign
Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit
loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister
question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact
from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek
to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration[27:2],
without an agreement with Sweden.
How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing
could interpret the Communique as it did?
As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it
is impossible to make any definite assertions.
The Norwegian government may possibly have felt assured that the
Communique did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its assumed legal
right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs--that demand could
scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden--and passed over the
Swedish delegates' plain intention to bind Norway to the _execution_ of
that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of
protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have
remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates' intentions with regard to
the wording of the Communique on that point, and the Norwegian
governments attitude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange,
especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War
Minister STANG'S open declaration in the Storthing, that according to his
idea of the matter, _the decisions in respect to the identical laws were
scarcely in accordance with Mr_ BLEHR'S _interpretation of the
Communique_.
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