In his despatch, General Murray, the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, characterised it as a most successful operation which only the waterless nature of the country had prevented from being “a complete disaster to the enemy.” We had been obliged to withdraw again to our water supplies, but we immediately began to prepare a second attack in greater force. This time great cisterns were set up forward, and filled with rail-borne water. Three weeks of careful preparation were allowed for what was to prove one of the most hotly contested actions fought in the Eastern theatre. We were to attack a Turkish force of about 30,000 men which lay upon a front of some sixteen miles, between Gaza on the north and Hereira and Sheria to the south-east. Two ridges, Sheikh Abbas and Mansura, run almost at right angles to the coast and command the town of Gaza from the south, and the capture of these heights was allotted to the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th Divisions. On their left flank was the sea, and their right, on the Hereira front, was protected by the Desert Column, consisting of cavalry units and of the Imperial Camel Corps which was manned by Australian, New Zealand, and British personnel. The eight Tanks were to be widely spaced along the crucial five miles of attack. The 53rd Division nearest to the sea was to have two Tanks, which were to be held in reserve until the infantry had taken their first objective. Next to them the 52nd Division was to have four Tanks, which were to support the infantry in the attack on the Mansura Ridge. With the 54th Division, two Tanks were to support the attack on the Sheikh Abbas Ridge. The battle was to be in two phases; the Turkish outer defences were to be taken in the first phase, and in the second his inner ring was to be broken through and Gaza itself taken. It was a country of sand dunes, deep nullahs, and criss-cross ridges, a labyrinth admirably adapted to defence and containing endless natural machine-gun positions. Between Gaza and the sea the enemy had built a double line of trenches and redoubts[54]“strongly held by infantry and machine-guns well placed and concealed in impenetrable cactus hedges built on high mud banks and enclosing orchards and gardens on the outskirts of the town.” The Tank Detachment had been able to do little or no reconnaissance; routes had been arranged to the starting-places, and petrol and ammunition dumps had been formed in convenient places, but no forward preparations had been possible. All eight Tanks reached their assembly places before daybreak on April 17, and at zero hour, the dawn of what promised to be a day of scorching heat, the first phase of the attack was successfully launched.