[79]“Within the space of five days the town of Amiens and the railway centring upon it had been disengaged. Twenty German Divisions had been heavily defeated by thirteen British Infantry Divisions and three Cavalry Divisions, assisted by a regiment of the 33rd American Division and supported by some 400 Tanks. Nearly 22,000 prisoners and over 400 guns had been taken by us, and our line had been pushed forward to a depth of some twelve miles in a vital sector. Further, our deep advance, combined with the attacks of the French Armies on our right, had compelled the enemy to evacuate hurriedly a wide extent of territory to the south of us. “The effect of this victory--following so closely after the Allied victory on the Marne--upon the _moral_ both of the German and British troops was very great. Buoyed up by the hope of immediate and decisive victory, to be followed by an early and favourable peace, constantly assured that the Allied reserves were exhausted, the German soldiery suddenly found themselves attacked on two fronts and thrown back with heavy losses from large and important portions of their earlier gains. The reaction was inevitable and of a deep and lasting character. “On the other hand, our own troops felt that at last their opportunity had come, and that, supported by a superior artillery and numerous Tanks they could now press forward resolutely to reap the reward of their patient, dauntless, and successful defence in March and April.” We knew, however, that we had still hard fighting before us, and we were careful to analyse every phase of the action to see if we could not learn some practical lesson from it that should help us in the coming months. The Tank Command noted several points “for reference.” In the first place, the battle would have been ended the quicker if the Tanks had had a larger general reserve. Then neither the Mark V. nor the Whippet was fast enough for open warfare. Had we then possessed machines such as we have now,[80] of double the speed of the Mark V., and having a radius of action of 100 miles and more, we should, at a modest estimate, have finished the battle on the first day. Last, we had not used our Whippets to the best advantage. The 3rd (Light) Brigade Commander, Brig.-General Hardress-Lloyd, thus admirably summarised the lessons of the battle, and laid down alternative principles upon which the light machines might be used: “I do not think it advisable to attempt to use the present Whippet in conjunction with cavalry. Better results would have been obtained during these operations if Whippets had been working in close liaison with Mark V. Tanks and infantry. “The Whippet is not fast enough to conform to cavalry tactics in the early stages of a battle.