“The Whippets’ rôle should be to push on amongst the retreating enemy and prevent him from reorganising, engage reinforcements coming up, eventually enabling the infantry to make a further advance, capture prisoners, guns, etc. “... They must move forward in close touch with the heavy Tanks so as to be near enough up to go though when required. If kept back with the cavalry the speed of the Whippet is not sufficient to enable the machine to be in the forward position at the required moment, and its offensive power will be seriously diminished.” But it was not for us that the battle of August 8 had its chief lessons. The German High Command waxed eloquent with indignant exhortation, and demanded passionately that the experiences of the German Army should be utilised, and that such things as had occurred on the 8th should never happen again. On August 11 General Ludendorff issued a secret Order: “Troops allowed themselves to be surprised by a mass attack of Tanks, and lost all cohesion when the Tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken through under cover of a mist, natural and artificial. The defensive organisation, both of the first line and in the rear, was insufficient to permit of a systematic defence.... As a weapon against Tanks, the prepared defence of the ground must play a larger part than ever, and the aversion of the men to the pick and shovel must be overcome at all hazards.... Especially there must be defences against Tanks. It was absolutely inadmissible that the Tanks, having penetrated into our advance line without meeting with obstacles or anything, should be able to push on along the roads or beside them for miles.... The principle that a body of troops even when surrounded must defend their ground, unless otherwise ordered, to the last man and the last cartridge, seems to have fallen into oblivion ... a large proportion of our ranks fight unskilfully against Tanks. A Tank is an easy prey for artillery of all calibres....” An account follows of measures for the proper disposition of artillery against Tanks, and the rest of the Order is occupied with directions to the infantry concerning the question at what range the anti-Tank rifle and gun are most effective. The consideration of these points is long and exhaustive. Ludendorff further hopes much from “the active and inventive genius of the lower ranks of the non-commissioned officers to arrange Tank traps, and demands that every encouragement should be shown to those who show any inventive talent.” These were but peddling remedies. When, as at Amiens, the understanding between infantry and Tanks is almost perfect, and when the magnificent _élan_ of an assault by Australians and Canadians is supported by the weight of 400 Tanks, not even the troops of what was the best-trained Army in the world can stand the concerted shock of their attack.