[101]“Our operations were opened on October 17 by an attack by the 4th Army on a front of about ten miles from Le Cateau southwards, in conjunction with the French 1st Army operating west of the Sambre and Oise Canal. The assault, launched at 5.20 a.m., was delivered by the 9th, 2nd American and 13th Corps.... The enemy was holding the difficult wooded country east of Bohain, and the line of the Selle north of it, in great strength, his infantry being well supported by artillery.” The 4th was the Tank Brigade concerned. The 1st Battalion was allotted to the 9th Corps on the right. The 2nd American Corps in the centre fought as usual with the 301st American Battalion. On the left the 13th Corps had the 16th Battalion, while the 6th Tank Battalion was in Army reserve. The Germans had chosen their battle ground with great skill. They held the right bank of the Selle, and the river itself, therefore, threaded No-Man’s-Land. This particular choice of a defence was undoubtedly dictated by a fear of Tanks. There had been heavy rain, and the river was in flood. [102]“Very little was known of the stream, except that it varied every few yards in nature, breadth and depth; and the only way of establishing safe crossing-places for the Tanks, was by personal reconnaissance. “This work was done successfully by the R.O.’s of the 1st and 301st Battalions, which were fighting alongside each other. “The reconnaissance necessary on the front of the 301st promised to be extremely dangerous and the success rather doubtful, owing to the presence of several unlocated Boche posts on our side of the stream. It was a question of slipping through these unobserved, gaining the necessary information, and coming back again through their lines. “Lieutenant T. C. Naedale, Battalion R.O., undertook to do this in the company of an infantry guide from the sector. This officer walked down the stream 500 yards, literally under the noses of the Boche posts, and returned to our lines with the requisite intelligence. He was thus able to pick safe crossings for all his Tanks.” At 5.30 a.m. on October 17, the fog was so thick that Tanks had to move forward on compass bearings. The infantry could see nothing, and had, in many cases, to rely almost entirely on the Tanks as guides. Every Tank of the forty-eight carried a crib, and with their help, north of St. Souplet and of Molain, both Tank Battalions crossed the river in safety at the previously selected fords. The Germans had clearly relied almost entirely upon the flooded river for their defence, and it was only here and there that we met with any opposition. Isolated posts would, however, occasionally hold out with great vigour, and what with the fog and the irregular speed of our advance, the whole battle was an exceedingly confused one. The enemy was well supplied with artillery, and wherever the fog permitted made good use of it.