Great Britain. Army. Royal Tank Corps; Tanks (Military science)
Failure of rollers was succeeded by failure of sprockets. Sprockets and
rollers were hardly cured when the Germans produced a very reliable
armour-piercing bullet. This after a very short innings was defeated by
the arrival of the Mark IV. Tank. The Mark IV. Tank was barely rescued
from the mud of Flanders by the invention of the unditching beam, when
we discovered that the Hindenburg trenches were about one foot too wide
to cross without some form of help to the Tank. This difficulty was
overcome, but about this time the effect of concentrated machine-gun
fire upon Mark IV. Tanks must have become known to the Germans, as
also their vulnerability to the ordinary field gun. The position
with regard to both splash and casualties from guns firing over the
sights, was becoming serious when the arrival of Mark V. Tank, with its
increased handiness and speed, put an end to the splash difficulty for
ever, and defeated the field gun for a good long time.
So on to the last days of the war, when we were able to look forward
to 1919 with a certain knowledge that we had much in hand against any
measure of opposition--short of a superior Tank--that the enemy could
produce.
The idea undoubtedly exists still in the minds of certain people
that the particular form of Tank which they have seen or fought with
represents the latest word in design. It does not. The latest Tank
produced in any bulk was the type that marched through London on July
19. It has never fought, and it represents the last word only of the
elementary series of Tanks of which Mark I. was the original.
* * * * *
If finality in design has by no means been approached in the war,
the same may be said as regards the employment of the then existing
types. This depended, after due consideration of their limitations
and powers, on the training of personnel, not only of the Tank Corps,
but essentially of infantry too. Lack of time, lack of opportunity,
and wastage of trained personnel were the great difficulties which
confronted commanders of every arm and formation in their efforts to
reach even average standards of skill in only a few of the commoner
phases of warfare. With the Tank Corps the additional difficulties of
mechanical training were no more than balanced by freedom from the
trench routine of troops employed for defence. For the infantry Tank,
the training of Tank personnel alone is not sufficient. In the assault,
Tanks are no more than a part of infantry, an integral part of the
_troupes d’assaut_. For real success, i.e., cheap success, not only
must the two arms train and re-train together, but they should live
together, feed together, and drink together.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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