99. [I answer] A thorough Vedântin like thee does not accept any where the existence of qualities or that which possesses qualities; but if imagined qualities are done away with [by deeper insight], real qualities are nowhere done away with [Footnote: Clearer insight abolishes imagined attributes, as __e. g.__ the supposed snake in the rope; but real attributes remain untouched, and we hold Brahman's attributes to be real.--I read __abâdha.h__ in I. 2.]. 100. If Brahman is understood to be destitute of qualities, then "truth," etc., will not be applicable to Him; but, if so, there arises a contradiction in such passages [of Šruti] as "he is the truthful," etc. [Footnote: I do not know where this passage occurs, but the kindred word __satyadharman__ is applied to several deities in the Rigveda.] 101. When the existence of such a thing as a quality is admitted, we can imagine it in something else [Footnote: The Vedântins hold that nothing exists besides Brahman; and yet, although they thus deny the existence of any other thing or quality, they hold that certain qualities are imagined to exist in him, forgetting that only one who has seen silver can imagine __rajatatva__ in nacre.]; but to imagine that nacre is silver, we must first know clearly what silver is. 102. This universe is based on the soul as its site, being imagined in it by ignorance; some teachers would describe it as an illusory emanation [Footnote: It is a favourite doctrine of the Vedânta that ignorance, as being imagined by ignorance, is itself false.]; but this is not a pleasing doctrine to me. 103. It cannot be said that all this universe is false; since it is really the plaything of Hari, who is eternally engaged in sport [Footnote: Manu, i. 80, "There are numberless Manvantaras, creations and destructions numberless; the being supremely exalted performs all this, as in sport, again and again."] 104. The external world is not like a dream; for in dreams there is sleep and a host of imperfections; what we eat or drink in dreams gives us no enjoyment, but these things are enjoyable in our waking state. 105. If all that is seen were false, then how could it produce effects? The carrying of water in a jar is not false; all we can say is that it is transient. 106. The idea that all this world is false, is opposed to experience; for of what use would be all the expiations for sin, prescribed in the law-books? Why are these thieves to be punished even by the king? The upholder of the doctrine of Mâyâ can assert anything on his oath, but all is false. 107. Thou canst not say that the visible world is only like the transitory enjoyment of one who smells a wreath of flowers; however closely it is scanned, there is no overpowering evidence of its unreality [to preclude the presumption founded on experience]; it continually manifests itself to us as eternal in its stream of successive events.