Mr. William Jennings Bryan, who has twice been the candidate of a great political party for the highest and most responsible office in one of the greatest countries in the world, and who has himself been one of its national law-makers, can hardly be looked upon as too idealistic for the practical affairs of the world. Mr. Bryan now comes forward and places his unqualified, indeed, his earnest approval, upon this plan for the earliest possible organization of the International Conference at The Hague upon a firm and permanent foundation, without authority at the beginning to enact their resolutions into laws binding upon the nations, but with the right to assemble at stated intervals, upon their own initiative, for the discussion of such international questions as the current of events may make paramount, and for suggesting to the various governments of the world suitable and timely amendments to the law of nations, and in the present method of its administration. [Illustration: COUNT ALBERT APPONYI President Hungarian Group, Interparliamentary Union] Furthermore, Mr. Bryan proposed at this conference and declared his intention of hereafter throwing the full weight of his influence in favor of an agreement between nations to refer all questions to arbitration in the first instance, even though the several governments reserve the right, in matters affecting their vital interests or national honor, to appeal from the decision of the arbitrators to a conflict upon the battlefield. Even if the nations of Europe found themselves unable at this moment to agree to this proposition, there is certainly nothing in the proposition that is unwise in the abstract, and if nothing is ever proposed which the world is not ready at the instant to adopt, it is utterly impossible to make any progress at all. But in the light of the salient facts of history, Mr. Bryan’s proposition is certainly entitled to the immediate consideration of every statesman in the world, and, in my judgment, it can count on acceptance in a comparatively short time. The people of England have probably not yet forgotten the fact that if the Duke of Argyll had lived previously to the twenty-second day of June, 1819, he would have had the right, under the laws of England, to prove that he owned the estate of which he is now the distinguished possessor, by defeating any claimant to the same on the field of personal encounter in the presence of the judges of this great nation. I do not happen to know how long the family of Argyll has been taking account of itself, but I venture to say that some of the ancestors of the present duke were among those whose sentiment against the trial by jury of questions affecting title to land made it impracticable to substitute judicial decisions for wage of battle in such questions several centuries ago. But opinions change—principles never. Therefore, it is eminently wise and practical for the progressive statesmen of to-day to put forward the