The despatch of 25th December, 1917, makes frequent reference to the adverse conditions. In paragraph 55 there is the following sentence: “The year was far spent. The weather had been consistently unpropitious, and the state of the ground, in consequence of the rain and shelling combined, made movement inconceivably difficult.” After considering the various factors “affecting the problem, among them the desirability of assisting our Allies in the operations to be carried out by them on the 23rd October, in the neighbourhood of Malmaison, I decided to continue the offensive further and to renew the advance at the earliest possible moment consistent with adequate preparation.” The Division formed part of the assaulting line on 26th October when ground was gained. This is officially designated the Second Battle of Passchendaele. Much rain fell in October and it was only on ground above the general level that progress could be made in the various attacks undertaken. The Division remained in the salient, chiefly between Houthulst Forest and Passchendaele, for the next three months. The despatch of 20th July, 1918, deals with the German attack in the St. Quentin district which began on 21st March. Regarding the position west of St. Quentin, in the centre of the Fifth Army, on the 22nd, paragraph 22, Sir Douglas Haig said: “Our troops, fighting fiercely and continuously, were gradually forced out of the battle zone on the whole of this front and fell back through the 20th and 50th Divisions holding the third defensive zone ... in the hope of re-organising behind them.” “By 5.30 p.m. the enemy had reached the third zone at different points and was attacking the 50th Division heavily between Villéveque and Boucly. Though holding an extended front of some 10,500 yards, the Division succeeded in checking the enemy’s advance, and by a successful counter-attack drove him temporarily from the village of Coulaincourt. At the close of the engagement, however, the troops of the 50th Division about Pœuilly had been forced back, and by continued pressure along the south bank of the Omignon river the enemy had opened a gap between their right flank and the troops of the 61st Division.”... At this gap strong bodies of German troops broke through the third defensive zone. As all available reserves at the disposal of the Fifth Army had been thrown into the fight, the Army Commander at 11 p.m. on the 22nd issued orders to withdraw to the Somme. Paragraph 23: “These withdrawals were carried out under constant pressure from the enemy, covered by rearguards of the 20th, 50th and 39th Divisions which were continually in action with the German troops.”