The Theistic Conception of the World: An Essay in Opposition to Certain Tendencies of Modern ThoughtCocker, B. F. (Benjamin Franklin)
Religion
The Theistic Conception of the World: An Essay in Opposition to Certain Tendencies of Modern Thought
Cocker, B. F. (Benjamin Franklin)
Theism
Duration and succession, eternity and time, are not identical. Duration
is the continuance in existence of finite creatures, a continuance which
is measured by the equable motion of planetary orbs, and imperfectly by
phenomenal changes in our mental states. Succession is simply an order
of phenomena, the recurrence, at regular or irregular intervals, of like
changes, or the series of different states in the same existence. _Time
is a certain correlation of successive existences._ Eternity is an
attribute of the absolute Being--the _timelessness_ of God. He is not
subject to the law of change, and therefore not to the law of time,
therefore his absolute being can not be measured by successive epochs.
Let us now endeavor to dismiss from our thought all this perplexing
necromancy of words, and humbly pray, with Themistocles, for "some sweet
voluptuous art of forgetting." Let us fix our mental gaze upon the
_objects_ of thought which are denoted by the terms _time_ and _space_,
and ask what are they? Are they existences or attributes, are they ideal
or real, are they entities or relations? Have we any clear and definite
notions of which these are the unequivocal signs? The solution of these
questions is the essential condition of a true philosophy of time and
space.
First of all, is it not self-evident that, if time and space are for us
the objects of thought, they must be conceived under the categories of
_Being_ or _Quality_ or _Relation_? If they can not be thought as real
existences, or as attributes of existing things, or as relations among
existing things, they can not be thought at all--they are non-entities,
and we can not think about nothing. "Thought can only be realized by
thinking _something_ ... this something must be thought as existing ...
and we can only think a thing as existing, by thinking it as existing in
this or that determinate manner of existence; and whenever we cease to
think of something as existing--something existing in a determinate
manner of existence--we cease to think at all."[100]
McCosh asserts that time and space are "neither substances, modes, nor
relations."[101] What, then, are they? He answers, "They seem to be
entitled to be put in a class by themselves, and resemble substances,
modes, relations only in that they are _existences, entities,
realities_."[102] But if they are entitled to be put in a class by
themselves, what is the name of that class, and by what characteristic
marks shall we distinguish it? If they are realities, they must have
being, or inhere in something that has being, or be relations of
something in being. If they are existences, they must be the objects of
_sense perception_, or _rational intuition_, or _immediate judgment_,
otherwise they can not be cognized at all, for "the mind can not create
objects of its own cognition."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account