The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
Nor is that irregularity of sentiments altogether without its utility,
by which the merit of an unsuccessful attempt to serve, and much more
that of mere good inclinations and kind wishes, appears to be imperfect.
Man was made for action, and to promote by the exertion of his faculties
such changes in the external circumstances both of himself and others,
as may seem most favourable to the happiness of all. He must not be
satisfied with indolent benevolence, nor fancy himself the friend of
mankind, because in his heart he wishes well to the prosperity of the
world. That he may call forth the whole vigour of his soul, and strain
every nerve, in order to produce those ends which it is the purpose of
his being to advance, Nature has taught him, that neither himself nor
mankind can be fully satisfied with his conduct, nor bestow upon it the
full measure of applause, unless he has actually produced them. He is
made to know, that the praise of good intentions, without the merit of
good offices, will be but of little avail to excite either the loudest
acclamations of the world, or even the highest degree of self-applause.
The man who has performed no single action of importance, but whose
whole conversation and deportment express the justest, the noblest, and
most generous sentiments, can be entitled to demand no very high reward,
even though his inutility should be owing to nothing but the want of an
opportunity to serve. We can still refuse it him without blame. We can
still ask him, what have you done? What actual service can you produce,
to entitle you to so great a recompense? We esteem you, and love you;
but we owe you nothing. To reward indeed that latent virtue which has
been useless only for want of an opportunity to serve, to bestow upon it
those honours and preferments, which, though in some measure it may be
said to deserve them, it could not with propriety have insisted upon, is
the effect of the most divine benevolence. To punish, on the contrary,
for the affections of the heart only, where no crime has been committed,
is the most insolent and barbarous tyranny. The benevolent affections
seem to deserve most praise, when they do not wait till it becomes
almost a crime for them not to exert themselves. The malevolent, on the
contrary, can scarce be too tardy, too slow, or deliberate.
It is even of use that the evil which is done without design should be
regarded as a misfortune to the doer as well as to the sufferer. Man is
thereby taught to reverence the happiness of his brethren, to tremble
lest he should, even unknowingly, do any thing that can hurt them, and
to dread that animal resentment which he feels is ready to burst out
against him, if he should without design be the unhappy instrument of
their calamity.
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