The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
Nature, however, when the implanted the seeds of this irregularity in
the human breast, seems, as upon all other occasions, to have intended
the happiness and perfection of the species. If the hurtfulness of the
design, if the malevolence of the affection, were alone the causes which
excited our resentment, we should feel all the furies of that passion
against any person in whose breast we suspected or believed such designs
or affections were harboured, though they had never broke out into any
actions. Sentiments, thoughts, intentions, would become the objects of
punishment; and if the indignation of mankind ran as high against them
as against actions; if the baseness of the thought which had given birth
to no action, seemed in the eyes of the world as much to call aloud for
vengeance as the baseness of the action, every court of judicature would
become a real inquisition. There would be no safety for the most
innocent and circumspect conduct. Bad wishes, bad views, bad designs,
might still be suspected; and while these excited the same indignation
with bad conduct, while bad intentions were as much resented as bad
actions, they would equally expose the person to punishment and
resentment. Actions therefore which either produce actual evil, or
attempt to produce it, and thereby put us in the immediate fear of it,
are by the Author of nature rendered the only proper and approved
objects of human punishment and resentment. Sentiments, designs,
affections, though it is from these that according to cool reason human
actions derive their whole merit or demerit, are placed by the great
Judge of hearts beyond the limits of every human jurisdiction, and are
reserved for the cognizance of his own unerring tribunal. That necessary
rule of justice, therefore, that men in this life are liable to
punishment for their actions only, not for their designs and intentions,
is founded upon this salutary and useful irregularity in human
sentiments concerning merit or demerit, which at first sight appears so
absurd and unaccountable. But every part of nature, when attentively
surveyed, equally demonstrates the providential care of its Author, and
we may admire the wisdom and goodness of God even in the weakness and
folly of men.
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