The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
There are certain principles established by Nature for governing our
judgment concerning the conduct of those we live with. As long as we
decide according to those principles, and neither applaud nor condemn
any thing which Nature has not rendered the proper object of applause or
condemnation, nor any further than she has rendered it such, as our
sentence is, in this case, if I may say so, quite agreeable to law, it
is liable neither to repeal nor to correction of any kind. The person
concerning whom we form these judgments, must himself necessarily
approve of them. When he puts himself into our situation, he cannot
avoid viewing his own conduct in the very same light in which we appear
to view it. He is sensible, that to us, and to every impartial
spectator, he must necessarily appear the natural and proper object of
those sentiments which we express with regard to him. Those sentiments,
therefore, must necessarily produce their full effect upon him, and he
cannot fail to conceive all the triumph of self-approbation from, what
appears to him, such merited applause, as well as all the horrors of
shame from, what, he is sensible, is such deserved condemnation.
But it is otherwise, if we have either applauded or condemned him,
contrary to those principles and rules which Nature has established for
the direction of our judgments concerning every thing of this kind. If
we have either applauded or condemned him for what, when he put himself
into our situation, does not appear to him to be the object either of
applause or condemnation; as in this case he cannot enter into our
sentiments, provided he has any constancy or firmness, he is but little
affected by them, and can neither be much elevated by the favourable,
nor greatly mortified by the unfavourable decision. The applause of the
whole world will avail but little, if our own conscience condemn us; and
the disapprobation of all mankind is not capable of oppressing us, when
we are absolved by the tribunal within our own breast, and when our own
mind tells us that mankind are in the wrong.
But though this tribunal within the breast be thus the supreme arbiter
of all our actions, though it can reverse the decisions of all mankind
with regard to our character and conduct, and mortify us amidst the
applause, or support us under the censure of the world; yet, if we
inquire into the origin of its institution, its jurisdiction we shall
find is in a great measure derived from the authority of that very
tribunal, whose decisions it so often and so justly reverses.
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