The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
It scarce ever happens, however, that we are capable of adjusting our
passive feelings to this perfect propriety. We indulge ourselves, and
even the world indulges us, in some degree of irregularity in this
respect. Though we should be too much affected by what concerns
ourselves, and too little by what concerns other men, yet, if we always
act with impartiality between ourselves and others, if we never actually
sacrifice any great interest of others, to any little interest of our
own, we are easily pardoned: and it were well, if, upon all occasions,
those who desire to do their duty were capable of maintaining even this
degree of impartiality between themselves and others. But this is very
far from being the case. Even in good men, the judge within is often in
danger of being corrupted by the violence and injustice of their selfish
passions, and is often induced to make a report very different from what
the real circumstances of the case are capable of authorizing.
There are two different occasions, upon which we examine our own
conduct, and endeavour to view it in the light in which the impartial
spectator would view it. First, when we are about to act; and, secondly,
after we have acted. Our views are very partial in both cases, but they
are most so, when it is of most importance that they should be
otherwise.
When we are about to act, the eagerness of passion will seldom allow us
to consider what we are doing with the candour of an indifferent person.
The violent emotions which at that time agitate us, discolour our views
of things, even when we are endeavouring to place ourselves in the
situation of another, and to regard the objects that interest us, in the
light in which they will naturally appear to him. The fury of our own
passions constantly calls us back to our own place, where every thing
appears magnified and misrepresented by self-love. Of the manner in
which those objects would appear to another, of the view which he would
take of them, we can obtain, if I may say so, but instantaneous
glimpses, which vanish in a moment, and which even while they last are
not altogether just. We cannot even for that moment divest ourselves
entirely of the heat and keenness with which our peculiar situation
inspires us, nor consider what we are about to do with the complete
impartiality of an equitable judge. The passions, upon this account, as
father Malebranche says, all justify themselves, and seem reasonable,
and proportioned to their objects, as long as we continue to feel them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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