The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
When the action is over, indeed, and the passions which prompted it have
subsided, we can enter more coolly into sentiments of the indifferent
spectator. What before interested us, is now become almost as
indifferent to us as it always was to him, and we can now examine our
own conduct with his candour and impartiality. But our judgments now are
of little importance, compared to what they were before; and when they
are most severely impartial, can commonly produce nothing but vain
regret, and unavailing repentance, without securing us from the like
errors for the future. It is seldom, however, that they are quite candid
even in this case. The opinion which we entertain of our own character,
depends entirely on our judgment concerning our past conduct. It is so
disagreeable to think ill of ourselves, that we often purposely turn
away our view from those circumstances which might render that judgment
unfavourable. He is a bold surgeon, they say, whose hand does not
tremble when he performs an operation upon his own person; and he is
often equally bold who does not hesitate to pull off the mysterious veil
of self-delusion, which covers from his view the deformities of his own
conduct. Rather than see our own behaviour under so disagreeable an
aspect, we too often, foolishly and weakly, endeavour to exasperate anew
those unjust passions which had formerly misled us; we endeavour by
artifice to awaken our old hatreds, and irritate afresh our almost
forgotten resentments: we even exert ourselves for this miserable
purpose, and thus persevere in injustice, merely because we once were
unjust, and because we are ashamed and afraid to see that we were so.
So partial are the views of mankind with regard to the propriety of
their own conduct, both at the time of action and after it; and so
difficult is it for them to view it in the light in which any
indifferent spectator would consider it. But if it was by a peculiar
faculty, such as the moral sense is supposed to be, that they judged of
their own conduct, if they were endued with a particular power of
perception, which distinguished the beauty or deformity of passions and
affections; as their own passions would be more immediately exposed to
the view of this faculty, it would judge with more accuracy concerning
them, than concerning those of other men, of which it had only a more
distant prospect.
This self-deceit, this fatal weakness of mankind, is the source of half
the disorders of human life. If we saw ourselves in the light in which
others see us, or in which they would see us if they knew all, a
reformation would generally be unavoidable. We could not otherwise
endure the sight.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account