The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
If the actual sensation of positive pain was in itself so little to be
feared, that of pleasure was still less to be desired. Naturally the
sensation of pleasure was much less pungent than that of pain. If,
therefore, this last could take so very little from the happiness of a
well-disposed mind, the other could add scarce any thing to it. When the
body was free from pain and the mind from fear and anxiety, the
superadded sensation of bodily pleasure could be of very little
importance; and though it might diversify, could not be properly be said
to increase the happiness of this situation.
In ease of body, therefore, and in security or tranquillity of mind,
consisted, according to Epicurus, the most perfect state of human
nature, the most complete happiness which man was capable of enjoying.
To obtain this great end of natural desire was the sole object of all
the virtues, which, according to him, were not desirable upon their own
account, but upon account of their tendency to bring about this
situation.
Prudence, for example, though according to this philosophy, the source
and principle of all the virtues, was not desirable upon its own
account. That careful and laborious and circumspect state of mind, ever
watchful and ever attentive to the most distant consequences of every
action, could not be a thing pleasant or agreeable for its own sake, but
upon account of its tendency to procure the greatest goods and to keep
off the greatest evils.
To abstain from pleasure too, to curb and restrain our natural passions
for enjoyment, which was the office of temperance, could never be
desirable for its own sake. The whole value of this virtue arose from
its utility, from its enabling us to postpone the present enjoyment for
the sake of a greater to come, or to avoid a greater pain that might
ensue from it. Temperance, in short, was nothing but prudence with
regard to pleasure.
To support labour, to endure pain, to be exposed to danger or to death,
the situations which fortitude would often lead us into, were surely
still less the objects of natural desire. They were chosen only to avoid
greater evils. We submitted to labour, in order to avoid the greater
shame and pain of poverty, and we exposed ourselves to danger and to
death in defence of our liberty and property, the means and instruments
of pleasure and happiness; or in defence of our country, in the safety
of which our own was necessarily comprehended. Fortitude enabled us to
do all this chearfully, as the best which, in our present situation,
could possibly be done, and was in reality no more than prudence, good
judgment, and presence of mind in properly appreciating pain, labour,
and danger, always choosing the less in order to avoid the greater.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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