The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.Smith, Adam
Philosophy
The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Or, an Essay Towards an Analysis of the Principles by Which Men Naturally Judge Concerning the Conduct and Character, First of Their Neighbours, and Afterwards of Themselves. to Which Is Added, a Dissertation on the Origin of Languages.
Smith, Adam
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Language and languages -- Early works to 1800
It is agreeable to sympathize with joy; and wherever envy does not
oppose it, our heart abandons itself with satisfaction to the highest
transports of that delightful sentiment. But it is painful to go along
with grief, and we always enter into it with reluctance[1]. When we
attend to the representation of a tragedy, we struggle against that
sympathetic sorrow which the entertainment inspires as long as we can,
and we give way to it at last only when we can no longer avoid it: we
even then endeavour to cover our concern from the company. If we shed
any tears, we carefully conceal them, and are afraid lest the
spectators, not entering into this excessive tenderness, should regard
it as effeminacy and weakness. The wretch whose misfortunes call upon
our compassion feels with what reluctance we are likely to enter into
his sorrow, and therefore proposes his grief to us with fear and
hesitation: he even smothers the half of it, and is ashamed, upon
account of this hard-heartedness of mankind, to give vent to the fulness
of his affliction. It is otherwise with the man who riots in joy and
success. Wherever envy does not interest us against him, he expects our
compleatest sympathy. He does not fear, therefore, to announce himself
with shouts of exultation, in full confidence that we are heartily
disposed to go along with him.
Footnote 1:
It has been objected to me that as I found the sentiment of
approbation, which is always agreeable, upon sympathy, it is
inconsistent with my system to admit any disagreeable sympathy. I
answer, that in the sentiment of approbation there are two things to
be taken notice of; first the sympathetic passion of the spectator;
and, secondly, the emotion which arises from his observing the perfect
coincidence between this sympathetic passion in himself, and the
original passion in the person principally concerned. This last
emotion, in which the sentiment of approbation properly consists, is
always agreeable and delightful. The other may either be agreeable or
disagreeable, according to the nature of the original passion, whose
feature it must always, in some measure, retain. Two sounds I suppose,
may, each of them, taken singly, be austere, and yet, if they are
perfect concords, the perception of their harmony and coincidence may
be agreeable.
Why should we be more ashamed to weep than to laugh before company? We
may often have as real occasion to do the one as to do the other: But we
always feel that the spectators are more likely to go along with us in
the agreeable, than in the painful emotion. It is always miserable to
complain, even when we are oppressed by the most dreadful calamities.
But the triumph of victory is not always ungraceful. Prudence, indeed,
would often advise us to bear prosperity with more moderation; because
prudence would teach us to avoid that envy which this very triumph is,
more than any thing, apt to excite.
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