Courts -- United States; Revolutions; United States -- Politics and government
_Federalist_ that it is not a writing which can give protection, but
only the intelligence and the sense of justice of the community itself.
"The truth is, that the general genius of a Government is all that can
be substantially relied upon for permanent effects. Particular
provisions, though not altogether useless, have far less virtue and
efficiency than are commonly ascribed to them; and the want of them will
never be, with men of sound discernment, a decisive objection to any
plan which exhibits the leading characters of a good Government." After
an experience of nearly a century and a quarter we must admit, I think,
that Hamilton was right. In the United States we have carried bills of
right and constitutional limitations to an extreme, and yet, I suppose
that few would care to maintain that, during the nineteenth century,
life and property were safer in America, or crime better dealt with,
than in England, France, or Germany. The contrary, indeed, I take to be
the truth, and I think one chief cause of this imperfection in the
administration of justice will be found to have been the operation of
the written Constitution. For, under the American system, the
Constitution, or fundamental law, is expounded by judges, and this
function, which, in essence, is political, has brought precisely that
quality of pressure on the bench which it has been the labor of a
hundred generations of our ancestors to remove. On the whole the result
has been not to elevate politics, but to lower the courts toward the
political level, a result which conforms to the _a priori_ theory.
The abstract virtue of the written Constitution was not, however, a
question in issue when Washington and his contemporaries set themselves
to reorganize the Confederation. Those men had no choice but to draft
some kind of a platform on which the states could agree to unite, if
they were to unite peacefully at all, and accordingly they met in
convention and drew the best form of agreement they could; but I more
than suspect that a good many very able Federalists were quite alive to
the defects in the plan which they adopted.
Hamilton was outspoken in preferring the English model, and I am not
aware that Washington ever expressed a preference for the theory that,
because of a written fundamental law, the court should nullify
legislation. Nor is it unworthy of remark that all foreigners, after a
prolonged and attentive observation of our experiment, have avoided it.
Since 1789, every highly civilized Western people have readjusted their
institutions at least once, yet not one has in this respect imitated
us, though all have borrowed freely from the parliamentary system of
England.[6]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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