It must be admitted that this reasoning was strategically not unsound, and that against a timid or over-cautious commander it might well have succeeded. Happily for Great Britain, the new British leader, General Maude, was a man who combined reasonable caution with the knowledge that war cannot be successfully waged without incurring some risks; and happily also, the summer months when active warfare was impossible had been utilised by the British War Office to reinforce and equip his army with such vigour and thoroughness that it had become a much more formidable weapon than the Turks imagined. Not only had additional troops been poured into Mesopotamia from France and elsewhere, until the numerical superiority had passed to the British, but in other respects the force had been completely reorganised. By the end of the summer light railways had been pushed forward, river steamers in great numbers had been collected from various parts of the world, stores of food and supplies of all kinds had been sent up the Tigris and Euphrates, the ports and the rivers themselves had been vastly developed for traffic. By the end of October General Maude had been able to move his headquarters from the base at Basra to the neighbourhood of the Turkish positions, in the knowledge that the difficulties of transport had been overcome, and that he had now under his hand a force of troops superior in numbers to his enemy, and sure for the future of food and all necessary supplies. It had been a great effort, and his own exertions had been incessant, but the worst was over. In a few weeks more, when the weather became fit for campaigning, he would be able to go forward with every hope of success. Early in December, when he brought together his Cavalry Division on the Tigris, the time had almost come.