What General Maude had then to consider, and had doubtless considered very carefully during the three months which had elapsed since he took over command in Mesopotamia, was his own plan of campaign. He knew that the country looked to him to retake Kut and re-establish the reputation of British arms in Asia, which the surrender of a British Division, and the bloody repulses we had suffered in trying to relieve it, had undoubtedly tarnished. That meant a renewed attack upon the Turks in their strong positions on the Tigris, which the army under his command was eager to undertake. And he now knew, or believed he knew, that the enemy intended to advance into Persia in his rear, where the British forces were small and the Russians not much stronger, while the Persians themselves were in very doubtful mood. He could hope for little co-operation on the part of the Russians, either there or on the side of the Caucasus, for Russia was in serious difficulties; nor could he hope for any help from the British forces in Egypt. They apparently had enough on their hands, and in any case they were separated from him by the Arabian desert. On both flanks of their great Asiatic battle-front the Turks were practically safe. For success against them he must depend solely upon the forces under his own command in the centre of Asia. And since the Allies in Europe were barely holding their own, he must have felt as Jervis felt when he sighted the Spanish fleet off St Vincent, that England had great need of a victory at that moment. It is evident from what General Maude has left on record that he had from the first contemplated the action he eventually took. On this point it is well to let him speak for himself. _Despatch of April 10, 1917._--“Briefly put,” he says, “the enemy’s plan appeared to be to contain our main forces on the Tigris, whilst a vigorous campaign, which would directly threaten India, was being developed in Persia. There were indications, too, of an impending move down the Euphrates towards Nasariyeh. To disseminate our troops in order to safeguard the various conflicting interests involved would have relegated us to a passive defensive everywhere, and it seemed clear from the outset that the true solution of the problem was a resolute offensive, with concentrated forces, on the Tigris, thus effectively threatening Baghdad, the centre from which the enemy’s columns were operating. Such a stroke pursued with energy and success would, it was felt, automatically relieve the pressure in Persia and on the Euphrates, and preserve quiet in all districts with the security of which we were charged. “This, then, was the principle which guided the subsequent operations, which may be conveniently grouped into phases as follows:-- “_First._--Preliminary preparations from 28th August to 12th December.” [Illustration: ON THE MARCH]