It would be confusing to follow up at this point General Maude’s summary of his operations, but enough of it has been given to show that from the time he took command he contemplated a “resolute offensive” on the Tigris, threatening Baghdad, and that his preliminary preparations for that movement were steadily pushed on until the 12th December, when all was ready. The immediate field of conflict on the Tigris, and the positions occupied by the conflicting armies, are shown in the accompanying sketch-map. [Illustration: SKETCH OF BRITISH POSITION ON TIGRIS DECEMBER 1916. _A.B.C.D.E._ SCALE ABOUT 8·1 MILES TO THE INCH] The Turks were astride the river. On the north or left bank they held the same positions as they had occupied since the fall of Kut. At Sannaiyat the enemy awaited attack in the same formidable labyrinth of trenches, flanked by marsh and river, from which in the early part of the year he had three times repelled the desperate onslaught of our troops. “Since then he had strengthened and elaborated this trench system, and a series of successive positions extended back as far as Kut, fifteen miles in the rear. The river bank from Sannaiyat to Kut was also intrenched.” On the south or right bank of the river the enemy was not so far forward. He had, on this side, withdrawn to a line of intrenched defences which curved from a point on the Tigris, only about three miles east of Kut, to a point on the Hai stream, and thence round again to the Tigris west of Kut. The Hai stream was also held for some miles southward with posts and mounted Arab auxiliaries. The British troops held the north bank of the Tigris up to the Turkish trenches at Sannaiyat, and the south bank for about eleven miles farther up-stream. Thus, as General Maude points out, the British were strategically better situated than the enemy, for while their flanks were secure the withdrawal of the enemy’s troops on the south bank seemed to offer a chance for a blow sooner or later at his communications on the north bank, which would mean the retreat or capture of the force at Sannaiyat. In these circumstances it was decided that the proper course was, first, to secure possession of the Hai stream, then to clear the enemy’s trench systems on the right bank of the Tigris, and finally to cross the Tigris as far west as possible. This idea of a turning movement by the south was not a new one, for during the British operations for the relief of Kut more than one attempt had been made to seize the Hai; but the British forces had been too weak, and the attempts had failed. Now, as shown above, General Maude’s army was better fitted in numbers and equipment to make the attempt with success.