I.T., 93 (iii.), directs the training of the section to include rough and ready expedients so as to form a fighting front in any direction. This training is of great value, both from a disciplinary point of view, as it makes men quick to move on an order, and also from the point of view of _moral_, as men accustomed to get sudden and unexpected orders given under imaginary circumstances will be more likely to keep cool, when such orders are necessitated by the stress of actual battle, than men who have always been trained in a deliberate fashion. Such sudden orders must in general mean one of two things, either that the enemy has got you, or you have got him, “on the hop,” if I may introduce an expression from the cricket field, and that there is every chance of the bowler, whoever he is, being badly scored off, unless he treats the batsman to something more difficult than the expensive half-volley. If you are fortunately able to find the enemy at a disadvantage, you will act against him by rifle fire alone; but, on the other hand, you may find yourself caught in a bad situation, by either artillery or rifle fire, or possibly by cavalry, who mean to use the steel. It follows then, in practising expedients, based, as they should be, on some possible situation, that you should make the central idea either offensive, as if attempting to bring your men into a position to get the best results from their fire, or defensive, as if to escape, or mitigate shell fire or rifle fire, to which you are subjected under adverse conditions. Against artillery fire from ranges or in positions at which you cannot reply effectively with rifle fire, your action at first, at all events, must be purely defensive, i.e., all you can do, will be to escape being overwhelmed by the shell fire, and even at effective rifle range, the shields of modern field guns, enable them to engage infantry on very equal terms, so long as the infantry is in front, or not far on a flank, of the line of guns.