“2d. That if this construction be erroneous, no testimony can be
received to charge one man with the overt acts of others until those
overt acts, as laid in the indictment, be proved to the satisfaction of
the court.
“The question which arises on the construction of the constitution, in
every point of view in which it can be contemplated, is of infinite
moment to the people of this country and to their government, and
requires the most temperate and the most deliberate consideration.
“Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war
against them.”
The Chief Justice then proceeds to elaborately discuss an overt act
of levying war. The opinion delivered by the Supreme Court in the
case of Bollman and Swartout was declared by him to be not correctly
understood; and that there must be, before an overt act of treason
is completed, either the actual employment of force or a military
assemblage of men, who are in a posture of war.
In conclusion the Chief Justice said:
“The law of the case being thus far settled; what ought to be the
decision of the court on the present motion? Ought the court to sit and
hear testimony which cannot affect the prisoner? or ought the court to
arrest that testimony? On this question much has been said: much that
may perhaps be ascribed to a misconception of the point really under
consideration. The motion has been treated as a motion confessedly made
to stop relevant testimony; and, in the course of the argument, it has
been repeatedly stated, by those who oppose the motion, that irrelevant
testimony may and ought to be stopped. That this statement is perfectly
correct is one of those fundamental principles in judicial proceedings
which is acknowledged by all, and is founded in the absolute necessity
of the thing. No person will contend that, in a civil or criminal case,
either party is at liberty to introduce what testimony he pleases,
legal or illegal, and to consume the whole term in details of facts
unconnected with the particular case. Some tribunal then must decide
on the admissibility of testimony. The parties cannot constitute this
tribunal; for they do not agree. The jury cannot constitute it; for the
question is whether they shall hear the testimony or not. Who then but
the court can constitute it? It is of necessity the peculiar province
of the court to judge of the admissibility of testimony. If the court
admit improper or reject proper testimony, it is an error of judgment;
but it is an error committed in the direct exercise of their judicial
functions.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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