The Trial of Theodore Parker: For the "Misdemeanor" of a Speech in Faneuil Hall against Kidnapping, before the Circuit Court of the United States, at Boston, April 3, 1855, with the DefenceParker, Theodore
Religion
The Trial of Theodore Parker: For the "Misdemeanor" of a Speech in Faneuil Hall against Kidnapping, before the Circuit Court of the United States, at Boston, April 3, 1855, with the Defence
Parker, Theodore
Antislavery movements -- Massachusetts -- Boston; United States -- Fugitive slave law (1850)
2. In 1816, in Massachusetts, there occurred the celebrated case of
Commonwealth _vs._ Bowen, to which I shall again refer in a subsequent
part of this defence. These are the facts. In September, 1815,
Jonathan Jewett was convicted of murder in Hampshire county,
Massachusetts, and sentenced to be hanged on the 9th of the following
November. He was confined at Northampton, and hung himself in his cell
on the night preceding the morning appointed for his public execution.
George Bowen was confined in the same jail, in an apartment adjacent
to Jewett's, and in such a situation that they could freely converse
together. Bowen repeatedly and frequently advised and urged Jewett to
destroy himself and thus disappoint the sheriff and the expectant
people. He did so, and the coroner's jury returned that he committed
suicide. But nevertheless, Bowen was indicted for the wilful murder of
Jewett. It was charged that he "feloniously, wilfully, and of his
malice aforethought, did counsel, hire, persuade, and procure the said
Jewett the said felony and murder of himself to do and commit;" or
that he himself murdered the said Jewett by hanging him.
At the trial Attorney-General Perez Morton contended that Bowen "was
guilty of _murder as principal_;" and he cited and relied chiefly on
the following authority from the Reports of our old friend Kelyng.
"Memorandum, that my brother _Twisden_ showed me a report
which he had of a charge given by Justice _Jones_ to the
grand-jury, at the King's Bench barre, _Michaelmas Term_, 9
_Car._ 1, in which he said, that poisoning another was
murder at common law. And the statute of 1 _Ed._ 6, was but
declaratory of the common law, and an affirmation of it. If
one drinks poison by the provocation of another, and dieth
of it, this is murder in the person that persuaded it. And
he took this difference. If A. give poison to J.S. to give
to J.D., and J.S. knowing it to be poison, give it to J.D.
who taketh it in the absence of J.S., and dieth of it; in
this case J.S., who gave it to J.D., is principal; and A.
who gave the poison to J.S., and was absent when it was
taken, is but accessory before the fact. But if A. buyeth
poison for J.S., and J.S., in the absence of A., taketh it
and dieth of it, in this case A., though he be absent, yet
he is principal. So it is if A. giveth poison to B. to give
unto C.; and B., not knowing it to be poison, but believing
it to be a good medicine, giveth it to C., who dieth of it;
in this case A., who is absent, is principal, or else a man
should be murdered, and there should be no principal. For
B., who knoweth nothing of the poison, is in no fault,
though he gave it to C. So if A. puts a sword into the hands
of a madman, and bids him kill B. with it, and then A. goeth
away, and the madman kills B. with the sword, as A.
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