commanded him, this is murder in A., though absent, and he is principal; for it is no crime in the madman, who did the fact by reason of his madness."[149] [Footnote 149: See the case in Kelyng's Reports (London, 1708), p. 52. The opinion of Justice _Jones_ was only the charge of an inferior judge given to the grand-jury in 1634.] Mr. Morton also laid down this as law, "_the adviser of one who commits a felony of himself is a murderer_." He might have added, "the adviser of one who breaks into his own house is a burglar." Chief Justice Parker--who once declared that the jury had nothing to do with the harshness of a law--charged the jury that the important question for them was, Did Bowen's advice induce Jewett to kill himself? if so, they were to find him guilty of wilful murder! "The community has an interest _in the public execution_ of criminals [the crowd having an _interest in the spectacle_] and to take such an one out of the reach of the law [by advising him to self-destruction] is no trivial offence." "_You are not to consider the atrocity of this offence in the least degree diminished by the consideration that justice was thirsting for its sacrifice_; and that but a small portion of Jewett's earthly existence could, in any event, remain to him."[150] [Footnote 150: 13 Mass. Rep. 356.] There was no doubt that Bowen advised Jewett to commit suicide; but the jury, in defiance of the judge's charge and Mr. Kelyng's law, nevertheless returned "NOT GUILTY."