On that night a pyroxyline mine was rolled into the attack trenches, and caused awful havoc, a number of the enemy being literally blown to atoms and many burnt and wounded. The remainder bolted, and, falling into our wire entanglement, were hurled down the hill. After this they again made two mad efforts to storm the hill from the north-west, but both assaults were repulsed with loss. On the morning of the 23rd another Japanese battalion, which was in this same ravine, came under the fire of our guns, took to the slopes, and in about ten minutes was also wiped out of existence. The initiative in thus checking the attack on the almost captured 203 Metre Hill was the conception and work of the Commandant alone, and was due to his true grasp of the situation and his taking the risk of sending guns where most other commanders would have feared to send them.[24] In Stössel's order of thanks to the troops for their work on this occasion, all the seniors were mentioned by name--except Smirnoff! From the moment this assault was beaten back, the trenches in front of 203 Metre Hill were gradually evacuated, and the enemy went to earth only on Angle Hill. All their sapping was confined to the north-east. On the western front of the Fortress there now remained in our possession only 203 Metre, Flat, and Divisional Hills. There was now more interference than ever with Smirnoff's arrangements. No sooner did the Commandant give an order (based on his personal acquaintance with the state of affairs) than it was altered. It was only through the mediation of Kondratenko that a deadlock was prevented; in fact, Kondratenko's chief work now consisted in persuading Stössel that the opinions of one of his friends--always diametrically opposed to Smirnoff's--were detrimental. Every morning and late every evening, after going round the fighting-line, Kondratenko, Biely, Grigorenko, and Khvostoff used to meet the Commandant. All questions as to the defence which were pending were then decided, and the programme of future work for armament, fortification of positions and distribution of troops and their supply was worked out. Each of those present received detailed instructions, and at the following day's meeting reported results. Stössel and his staff never took part in these meetings. Indeed, he, as a rule, did not interfere till after Smirnoff had issued his orders; he then altered them or by his own made it impossible to carry them out. But, notwithstanding this, work continued, for all knew that it was necessary, though the District Staff's interference often caused hopeless confusion, hindered success, and demoralized the garrison. The following is what Colonel Raschevsky wrote in his diary on September 28: