He also believes that this responsibility is in the first place to God, or some other supernatural Being. No doubt he is also responsible to his fellow-men, more especially to those among whom he is living; but a moment's reflection will show that this is not the leading idea. For a man must in the first place be responsible to his Maker rather than to his fellow-men. In the same way a child is first of all responsible to his parents, and then, secondly and consequently, to his brothers and sisters. Therefore, because God has made us, we are responsible to Him; and because He has placed us among other men, and presumably wishes us to take some part in human society, we are in a lesser degree responsible to them also. So the _brotherhood of man_, as it is called, naturally follows from the Fatherhood of God. (6.) _Man's moral sense of right and wrong._ In the next place, man has the remarkable faculty of distinguishing the _quality_ of acts which are free, regarding some as right and others as wrong, the latter being called _sins_. And it may be noticed in passing, that the existence of moral evil or sin seems to many to be an additional argument in favour of man's freedom; otherwise God would be the sole author of man's misdeeds. Of course, in this case, they would not be really _sins_, for if man has no free will, he is a mere machine, and can no more sin against God (or man either) than a watch can sin against its maker. Such a man might be imperfect, and so might a watch, but he could not be _wicked_; yet few will say that there are no wicked men in the world. Now we will call a being who is thus able to distinguish the quality of acts a _moral being_. Man is therefore a moral being, having this _moral sense_, as it is called, of distinguishing right from wrong. It will perhaps make the meaning of this moral sense plainer if we compare it with one of man's other senses, say that of sight. The one, then, distinguishes right from wrong, just as the other distinguishes red from yellow, or blue from green. And as man's sense of colours is not disproved by one man thinking a colour blue which another thinks green--or his sense of taste, by one man thinking a taste nice, which another thinks nasty--so his moral sense is not disproved by one man thinking an act right which another thinks wrong.