And this is confirmed by the fact that even the higher animals do not appear to have any idea of _responsibility_, or any sense of _right_ and _wrong_, which in man are the result of his known freedom. Of course, this also may be disputed, since as we punish a dog for doing what we dislike, it looks as if we held it responsible for the act. But this does not follow. We punish the dog to prevent its repeating the act. And it may avoid doing so, because its memory associates the act with _pain_, and not because it feels responsible for it, or considers it to be _wrong_. While in the vast majority of cases we never think of holding an animal responsible for its acts, or look upon its injuring anyone as a sin. We conclude, then, that _moral_ attributes form the great distinction between animals and men; because though animals have, or may have, a free will, it is not a _known_ freedom, so they are not able, like men, to _design_, and are hence not _personal beings_. Two further remarks may be made before leaving this subject. The first is, that though there are difficulties in placing this known freedom as the difference between animals and men, there are as great, if not greater, difficulties in placing it anywhere else. If we say that an ape or a dog can design, the difficulty is not lessened; it is merely transferred lower down the scale. Can a jellyfish design? The momentous attribute of known freedom must begin _somewhere_; and it seems less difficult to place it between animals and men than anywhere else. The second and more important point is, that our ignorance about animals is no reason for doubting what we do know about man. To do this would be most illogical. Indeed, we might as well deny that a man could see, or hear, because there are difficulties in deciding where sight and hearing commence in the scale of animal life. (_D._) CONCLUSION. We may now conclude this chapter. With regard to man, it is clear that his bodily, mental, and moral attributes are quite distinct. A man may be strong in body, yet of weak intellectual power; or he may have a great intellect, yet be of weak moral character. This makes it probable that human nature consists of three parts--_body_, _mind_, and _spirit_; the mind corresponding to the mental reasoning part of man, and the spirit to the free moral part, the word _soul_ being often used for either of these latter. And the difference between animals and men is probably that the former have no _spirits_, but only bodies and (undeveloped) minds. All life on this planet would then form three great groups--_vegetation_, consisting of matter alone; _animals_, of matter and mind; _man_, of matter, mind, and spirit. And from this it seems to follow that while a man's _body_ may (conceivably) have been evolved from any other form of matter, and his _mind_ from any other form of mind, yet his _spirit_ is essentially distinct, and cannot have been evolved from anything else.