But now suppose the last point of _purpose_ to be introduced. It is said that this is not a mere useless hole bored through a mountain; but a hole bored for a particular purpose; it is, in fact, a railway tunnel. Then all difficulties would disappear. Of course, whether we believe the tunnel was actually made depends upon what evidence we have; but it is clear that when we consider the _cause_ by which, and the _purpose_ for which, it is said to have been made, there is nothing incredible about it. Now a similar method must be adopted in regard to miracles. They must not be regarded simply as _marvels_, but as marvels said to have been brought about by an adequate _cause_, and for a sufficient _purpose_. And it is just these elements of cause and purpose which may make the marvels credible. We will consider these points in turn. (1.) _Miracles as marvels._ The first aspect of miracles is that of marvels. As such, they are events which seem to be _contrary to our experience_--contrary, that is, to what our experience of apparently similar events would lead us to expect. Suppose, for instance, it were stated that on one occasion three men were thrown into a furnace, but instead of being burnt to death they walked about, and in a few minutes came out alive and unhurt. Such a marvel would be contrary to our experience, and that it would be therefore _very improbable_ is obvious. But is this improbability sufficient in all cases to make the event incredible, no matter what testimony there may be in its favour? Hume's argument that it is sufficient is well known. He says we can only judge of the probability of anything, whether it be the occurrence of an event, or the truthfulness of the narrator, by _experience_. And as it is contrary to experience for miracles to be true, but not contrary to experience for testimony to be false, the balance of probability must always be against the miracle. But of course this reasoning, if true, must apply to all alleged events which are contrary to experience; and yet such events have occurred by the thousand. Let us take a single example. Everyone has had some experience as to how far it is possible to hear the human voice distinctly, and till the last half century, the limit has always been fixed at a few hundred yards. Now, suppose anyone were told for the first time that it was possible to speak right across England, he would justly say that it was utterly contrary to experience. No one, he would think, could possibly speak loud enough to be heard even twenty miles away. But ought he to add that it was therefore incredible?