From this it is clear that there must be some flaw in Hume's argument; and it is easily discovered. For the argument regards the event only as a marvel, and _without reference to its cause_. But we have no right to leave this out of account, nor do we in ordinary affairs. When anyone first hears of a marvel, he does not merely compare it with his previous experience, and then come to a decision; in which case, as Hume supposes, it might be always against the marvel. But he first inquires how this strange event is said to have been brought about. For if any cause is stated to have been at work as to the influence of which he knows nothing, then he has no experience of the proper kind to appeal to. There is the testimony in favour of the event as before; and if he disbelieves it, he does so, not because it is contrary to his experience, but because he thinks the supposed cause either did not exist, or would not have had the effect asserted. A reference to the previous example will make this quite plain. When the man first heard of persons talking across England, instead of at once declaring it incredible, he would, if a reasonable man, inquire as to the _cause_ of this. He would then be told that a wire was stretched across England with an instrument called a telephone at each end. Now, as to the possibility or adequacy of such a contrivance he might doubt a good deal; but one thing would be quite clear, that this was a case to which his experience, however large, did not apply. Here, then, is the explanation of Hume's argument. So long as a marvel, contrary to experience, is regarded _only_ as a marvel, the probability must be always against its truth. But if we inquire as to how it was brought about, and find that some _cause_ is said to have been at work, as to the influence of which we are ignorant, then the argument is no longer applicable. We have simply no experience of the proper kind to appeal to. Now this is precisely the case with regard to miracles. As marvels they seem contrary to experience; but they claim to have a special _cause_, to be specially worked by God--that is to say, by some action on His part different from His usual action in nature; and of the influence of this cause we have no experience whatever. We may, of course, deny its existence or doubt its adequacy; but the argument, that the event is contrary to experience, vanishes. It is clear then that the fact of miracles appearing to be contrary to experience is no reason for disbelieving _them_, though it might be a reason for disbelieving other alleged marvels, because they claim to have a special cause, by which to account for this special character. We have now to examine whether this special cause really existed--that is to say, we pass on to the second aspect of the miracles; our conclusion thus far being that they are credible as _marvels_, if it be credible that they were _specially worked by God_. (2.) _Miracles as special works of God._