In the first article of the treaty it was stated that both Powers should maintain a strict neutrality in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. This clause, however, was only intended to give the treaty a pacific appearance, for it was said in Clause 2 that if Russia intervened and thus compelled Germany to support her ally, Austria-Hungary, Turkey should be under the same obligation. Now, on the previous day, Germany had declared war on Russia, and thus the second article came into effect immediately. So by this treaty Germany really wanted to throw Turkey into the war by the side of the Central Powers. The other clauses laid down the conditions of a military co-operation. The most important one was that Turkey pledged herself to let the German military mission have the control in the conduct of operations, “according to what was agreed between His Excellency the War Minister and the President of the Military Mission.” Theoretically the treaty was to come to an end on December 31, 1918, but, if not denounced six months before that date, it was to be renewed for five years more. Clause 8 and last expressly said that the agreement was to be kept secret. On October 29, 1914, two Turkish torpedo-boats entered the port of Odessa, sank a Russian gun-boat, and fired at the French liner _Portugal_, and a Turco-German squadron made a surprise attack upon Theodosia and Novorossisk. Then the Allied Powers declared war on Turkey on November 5. Yet, after keeping neutral during the first three months of the war, Turkey seems to have had some hesitation in entering the conflict, notwithstanding German pressure. Most of her statesmen, who had weighed the financial and political consequences of her intervention, did not seem to consider they were to the advantage of their country; but the ambitious aims of Enver Pasha, who was devoted to Germany, for his success depended on her triumph, prevailed upon Turkey to yield. On the other hand, the Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha, pointed out on October 2, 1914, to the Austrian ambassador, who urged Turkey to utilise her fleet, that if the latter was ever defeated by the Russian fleet, Constantinople would be endangered. But a few days after, on October 15, he declared that the only obstacle to Turkish intervention was the penury of the treasury. Indeed, it is probable that Javid Bey, Minister of Finance, who had just signed an agreement with France concerning Turkish railways and finance, was not very eager to declare war on a country whose financial help was indispensable. He had even made overtures on several occasions to the ambassadors of the Entente, on behalf of the moderate members of the Ministry. In August, 1914, he offered to come to an agreement with the Entente providing that the Capitulations were suppressed, and in September he asked them to recognise the suppression of the Capitulations in order to be able to demobilise the Ottoman army. He resigned after the declaration of war,