Treaty of Sèvres (1920); World War, 1914-1918 -- Territorial questions -- Turkey; World War, 1914-1918 -- Turkey
“Article 11. To show the House of Austria it has an interest in
ejecting the Turks from Europe, and to neutralise her jealousy when
we shall conquer Constantinople, either by bringing about a war
between her and the old European States, or by giving her a share
of the conquest—and take it back from her later on.”
Russia never gave up this policy; indeed, she did not carry out her
plans by force of arms, for the other Powers would have opposed
them; but she resorted to all possible means to ensure its triumph.
She constantly aimed at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by
supporting and grouping the Christian elements included in this empire,
especially those of Slavonic race and Orthodox faith; and thus she
really partitioned the Empire and bound to herself the old Ottoman
provinces now raised to the rank of autonomous States. She acted most
cautiously, and in order to carry out her plans peacefully she sought
to dismember Turkey gradually and weaken her in order to finally rule
over her. It has been rightly said that as early as 1770 the Russians
opened the Eastern question exactly as it stands to-day, and already
advocated the solution they have always insisted upon.[45]
A century ago Alexander I declared it was time to drive the Turks out
of Europe. Talleyrand, in the account he gave of the conversations
between that Emperor and the French ambassador, relates that he said
one day:
“Now is the time to give the plans laid down by us at Tilsit the
liberal aspect that befits the deeds of enlightened sovereigns. Our
age, still more than our policy, requires that the Turks be driven
into Asia; it will be a noble deed to free these beautiful lands.
Humanity wants the eviction of those barbarians; civilisation
demands it.”
But Napoleon had fully understood the Russian policy, for at the end
of his life he said at St. Helena: “I could have shared Turkey with
Russia; many a time did I speak about it with the Emperor, Alexander
I, but every time Constantinople proved the stumbling-block. The Tsar
demanded it, and I could not cede it; for it is too precious a key; it
is worth an empire.”
At the memorable sitting of the House of Commons of March 29, 1791,
some speakers expressed the anxiety felt in Great Britain, just
after Catherine II had annexed the Crimea, lest the Russians should
capture the whole of the East. But Fox, the leader of the Liberal
party, declared he saw no ground for fear in the constant increase of
Muscovite power; he did his best to please the Tsarina, who, on her
side, continued to flatter him to obtain what she wanted from England;
he recalled that the British themselves had opened the Mediterranean to
Russian ships twenty years before, and he had told the French Minister
Vergennes, who desired him to protest against the annexation of the
Crimea, that Great Britain did not wish to raise any difficulty with
Catherine II.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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