“Perhaps I have stated General Alexiev’s opinions too unreservedly, as I wished to give this report a definite form. Though the brigadier-general does not wish to be the advocate or promoter of the idea of a separate peace with Turkey, I am sure he looks upon this as a highly profitable scheme. “Of course, many difficulties will have to be overcome in the conclusion of such a peace; but is not every matter of importance attended with difficulties? Public opinion should be warned that we cannot possibly secure the fulfilment of all our wishes at once, that it is impossible for us to shake off German hegemony, reconquer the shores of the Baltic, and the other provinces now in the hands of the enemy, and at the same time take Constantinople. The conquest of Tsarigrad in the present circumstances must necessarily raise many a political and moral question. The Turks, too, will have to be convinced. But they may be influenced both by logical and pecuniary arguments. If once the question of the loss of their capital is waived, it will be pretty easy for us to convince them that the Germans merely want their help for selfish purposes without any risk to themselves. If some of them turned a deaf ear to logical arguments, we might resort to more substantial arguments, as has always been the way with Turkey. “But the discussion of such details is still premature. For the present, the important points are: “1. Plainly to define our real war aim. “2. To decide, in connection with this aim, whether a separate peace with Turkey should not be contemplated at once. “3. To prepare public opinion—the Duma is to meet tomorrow—and our Allies for such a turn of events. “I want to conclude this long letter by stating that General Alexiev and I share the feelings of all Russians in regard to Constantinople, that we do not disregard the ‘historical call of Russia,’ in the solution of the Eastern question, but that we are actuated by the sincere wish to clarify the situation by distinguishing what is possible at the present time from those aspirations whose fulfilment is momentarily—only momentarily—impossible.” It is obvious that if, at the beginning of the war, General Kuropatkine maintained that it was a military necessity to occupy part of Turkey, it was because the only aim of Russia in entering into the conflict was the conquest of Constantinople.