"It may be said, who will object to a decree against the enemies of their country? The answer is obvious; time may engender discontent; a future day may condemn the proceeding; unforeseen events and even chance, that with wild caprice perplexes human affairs, may give us reason to repent. The punishment of traitors, however severe, cannot be more than their flagitious deeds deserve; but it behooves us, Conscript Fathers, to weigh well the consequences before we proceed to judgment. Acts of state, that sprung from policy, and were perhaps expedient on the spur of the occasion, have grown into precedents often found to be of evil tendency. The administration may fall into the hands of ignorance and incapacity; and in that case, the measure, which at first was just and proper, becomes by misapplication to other men and other times the rule of bad policy and injustice. "It must be admitted that, in times like the present, when Marcus Tullius Cicero conducts the administration, scenes of that tragic nature are not to be apprehended. But in a large populous city, when the minds of men are ever in agitation, a variety of jarring opinions must prevail. At a future day and under another consul, who may have an army at his back, falsehood may appear in the garb of truth, and gain universal credit. In such a juncture, should the consul, encouraged by our example, and armed with the power by the decree of the Senate, think proper to unsheath the sword, who shall stop him in his career? who will be able to appease his vengeance?... "But you will say, What is the scope of this long argument? Shall the conspirators be discharged, and suffered to strengthen Catiline's army? Far from it; my advice is this; let their estate and effects be confiscated; detain their persons in separate prisons, and for that purpose choose the strongest of the municipal towns; declare, by a positive law, that no motion in their favor shall be brought forward in the Senate, and that no appeal shall be made to the people. Add to your decree, that whoever shall presume to espouse the cause of the guilty shall be deemed an enemy to the Commonwealth." The year following the conspiracy of Catiline Cæsar secured the office of prætor. By this time Cæsar had secured such a hold upon the popular mind as to excite both the fear and hatred of the senatorial party. This fear and hatred were manifested during Cæsar's year of office as prætor by the Senate passing a decree depriving Cæsar and one of the tribunes (Cæcilius Metellus Cepos) of their offices. Fear of popular violence, however, soon induced the Senate to repeal this decree.