We must add, therefore, in that proportion to all our figures, and the result will slightly modify our conclusion, for as the central body--the enemy--has had more casualties, so it has a larger number of returns in proportion to its size, and the general deduction is that at the moment of writing (late winter) the Germanic body and the Allies opposed to them actually in the field or in training--just behind the field and ready to approach it within a few weeks--are nearly equal in total numbers, but with an appreciable margin still in favour of the enemy. SUPPLY _After numbers, the second main factor in the strength of an army is its supply--its means of obtaining clothes, food, shelter, ammunition and all those objects without which it can neither exist nor fight. The marvellously complicated and expensive organization entailed is here fully explained._ SUPPLY An army has two main factors of strength--that is, two main material factors apart from the moral factors of courage, discipline, habit, and relationship. These two material factors are first its numbers, and secondly its supply. The first of these is so much the more obvious in the public eye that it is often alone considered. It is, of course, the basis of all the rest. Unless you have a sufficient number of men for your task you cannot accomplish that task at all. But the second, which is less often considered by general opinion, is a necessity no less absolute than the necessity for adequate numbers. The general term “supply” covers all those objects without which an army cannot exist or fight--clothing, shelter, food, weapons, auxiliary instruments, ammunition. Now it is not the intention of these few lines to enter into details or to give precise information, such as may be obtained by reference to the text books, but rather to bring out a few main points about supply which are not generally considered, especially in moments such as this, when the obtaining of numbers by voluntary recruitment is the chief matter in the public mind. And these chief points with regard to supply may be put briefly in three groups. First we ought to grasp the _scale_ of supply: that is, the magnitude of the operation which is undertaken when an army is equipped, put into the field, and maintained there. Next we must grasp the _rate_ of supply--the pace at which the stream of supply has got to be kept moving (varying for various forms of supply) in order that an army shall neither break down nor dwindle in efficiency. Lastly we must consider the _delicacy_ or liability to _embarrassment_ of supply; that is, the difficulties peculiar to the maintenance of an army in the field, the ease with which that maintenance may be fatally interrupted, and the consequent embarrassment which an enemy may be made to feel, or which the enemy may make us feel, in this vital operation of war.