The unconscious : $b The fundamentals of human personality, normal and abnormalPrince, Morton
Science
The unconscious : $b The fundamentals of human personality, normal and abnormal
Prince, Morton
Psychology, Pathological; Subconsciousness
One other example of episodic amnesia I will cite, inasmuch as, aside
from the question of conservation, it is of practical importance, being
typical of experiences which lead to obsessions of phobia. The subject,
O. N., had an intense fear of towers such as might contain bells that
might ring. She had no recollection of the first occasion when the fear
occurred or of any experience which might have given rise to it, and, of
course, could give no explanation of the obsession. Neither in
abstraction or hypnosis could any related memories be evoked, but by
automatic writing she “unconsciously” described an emotional and
dramatic scene which was the occasion of the first occurrence of the
fear and which had taken place some twenty-five years previously when
she was a young girl.
With the reason for the amnesia we are not particularly concerned at
present excepting so far as it serves to make clear the distinction
between recollection and conservation, and to throw light on the nature
of the latter. The episodes in both these instances were of a strongly
emotional character. Now we have known for many years from numerous
observations that emotion tends to disrupt the mind and to dissociate
the experiences which give rise to the affective state so that they
cannot be brought back into consciousness. We may particularize further
and, making use of the known impulsive force of emotion, attribute the
dissociation (or inhibition) in many cases to a conflict between certain
ideas belonging to the experience and other opposing ideas which, with
the emotion, they have awakened. The impulsive force of the latter
ideas, being the stronger, dissociates, or, to use the expressive term
introduced by Freud, represses, the former. The principle of
dissociation by conflict has been formulated and elaborated by Freud in
his well-known theory which has been made use of to explain all
functional amnesias. It is not necessary to go as far as that, nor does
the theory as such concern us now. It is sufficient if in certain cases
the amnesia (or dissociation) is a dissociation (repression) induced by
the conative force of conflicting emotion. If so we should expect that
the amnesia would be of a temporary nature and would continue only so
long as the conflict and dissociating force continued. In any favorable
moment when repression ceased or failed to be operative, as in hypnosis
or abstraction, reproduction (recollection) could occur. But this
requires that the registration of the experience should be something
specific that can be dissociated without obliteration. And, further, it
must be something that can be so conserved, somehow and somewhere,
_during dissociation_ that, as in the case of reproduction by automatic
writing, it can escape the influence of the repressing force and express
itself autonomously, i.e., without the expressed memory of the
experience entering the personal consciousness. To this we shall return
later.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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